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Abstract
Is there timing ability in the exchange rate markets? We address this question by examining foreign
firms’ decisions to issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). Specifically, we test whether foreign
firms consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions and, in doing so, display some
ability to time their local exchange rate market. We study ADR issuances in the U.S. stock market
between 1976 and 2003. We find that foreign firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has
been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar and before their local currency becomes abnormally weak.
This evidence is statistically significant even after controlling for local and U.S. past and future stock
market performance and predicable exchange rate movements. Currency market timing is especially sig-
nificant i) for value companies, relatively small (yet absolutely large) companies issuing relatively large
amounts of ADRs, companies with higher currency exposure, manufacturing companies, and emerging
market companies, ii) during currency crises (when mispricings are rife) and after the integration of the
issuer’s local financial market with the world capital markets, iii) when the ADR issue raises capital
for the issuing firm (Level III ADR), and iv) regardless of the identity of the underwriting investment
bank. Currency market timing is also economically significant since it translates into total savings for
the issuing firms of about $646 million (or 1.86% of the total capital-raising ADR issue volume). In
contrast, we find no evidence of currency timing ability in a control sample made of non-capital raising
ADRs (Level II ADRs). These findings suggest that some companies may have, at least occasionally,
private information about foreign exchange.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes: G15, G32.
Keywords: Market Timing, Exchange Rate, ADR.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine whether foreign firms issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) have the
ability to time their corresponding exchange rate market when doing so.1 If present, such an ability would
allow these firms to enhance the proceeds of their ADR issuances.2 We find that these firms tend to issue
ADRs after their local currency has been abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar and before their local
currency becomes abnormally weak.3 This result, to our knowledge novel to the literature, is prima facie
puzzling since i) the currency market is among the largest and most liquid financial markets, and ii) the
inability to predict short- to long-term exchange rate fluctuations using macroeconomic fundamentals is one
of the profession’s most documented empirical facts.4 Yet, we provide evidence that this result is robust and
ultimately plausible. This result is potentially important as well since it suggests that some foreign firms
may have, at least occasionally, private information about their local exchange rates.5 Therefore, our study
has important implications for modeling and understanding trading activity in currency markets.
We obtain this result by proceeding in three stages. First, we remove the predictable component of all
currency returns in our sample. Second, to motivate our analysis, we conduct a preliminary investigation
of the dynamics of cumulative abnormal returns in proximity of ADR issue dates using a standard event
study methodology. We find a pattern of increasing cumulative abnormal (i.e., unpredictable) local currency
returns before ADR issue dates and decreasing cumulative abnormal local currency returns after ADR issue
dates. However, the statistical significance of this pattern is not uniform across different event window
1With the increasing integration of the world financial markets, an increasing number of firms are raising capital abroad
(Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006); Karolyi (2006)). The U.S. ADR market, in particular, has become one of the
most important venues for foreign firms to raise equity capital outside their local stock market.
2For instance, assume that a Brazilian company is planning to raise capital in one year by selling one share of its stock
in the ADR market. Today’s share price in the Brazilian stock market is 10 reals and is not expected to move for one year.
However, the company expects the real to first appreciate versus the U.S. dollar from BRLUSD = 5 to 2 in six months and then
depreciate again to 5 six months later. Converting the share into an ADR and selling it either today or in one year would raise
the company 2 dollars (local share price, 10, divided by units of local currency per one USD, 5) or 10 reals. Alternatively, given
its expectations, the company can sell the ADR in six months and convert the resulting proceeds of 5 dollars (10 reals divided
by BRLUSD = 2) into 25 reals (5 dollars times BRLUSD = 5) in six months. Thus, ceteris paribus, timing the BRLUSD
market allows the Brazilian company to maximize both the local-currency and dollar revenues of raising capital via an ADR
issuance.
3Many studies have found that firms are able to exploit temporary mispricings in their local capital markets via the issuance
of overpriced securities (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)).
Other studies have raised the possibility that foreign firms may be able to time the world equity market by cross-listings.
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999) found a statistically significant run-up and subsequent decline of abnormal
stock returns within horizons between one week and one year around ADR announcement and/or listing dates. While Miller
(1999) related this phenomenon to market segmentation, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) attributed it to strategic market timing
decisions by the management of the issuing firms. Along those lines, in a recent study of security issues on the world capital
markets, Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) provided evidence that firms successfully time their equity issuances
when the corresponding stock markets appear to be overvalued. Lastly, McBrady and Schill (2007) showed that corporations
“opportunistically” consider cross-currency differences in covered and uncovered interest yields when choosing the currency in
which to denominate their international debt.
4Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) showed that exchange rates and fundamentals are largely disconnected. Later studies
failed to dispute these basic results. Frankel and Rose (1995) provide a good survey of the subsequent empirical exchange rate
literature through the early 1990s. Mark (1995), Mark and Choi (1997), and Mark and Sul (2001) presented some limited
evidence that fundamentals may affect only long-term exchange rate returns, but not their short-term fluctuations.
5Accordingly, our findings may also help interpret recent evidence on aggregate order flow explaining and predicting currency
fluctuations (Evans and Lyons (2002), (2004), (2008)).
1
intervals evidenced by the confidence interval but we find the results are statistically significant for some
event windows (e.g., at five percent level for [-6, -1] and [1,6] event windows). This might be attributed to
several known shortcomings of event studies, such as event clustering, endogeneity, omitted variable bias,
and arbitrary horizon selection. For instance, the above approach does not control for the timing ability in
local and U.S. stock markets documented by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999).
These considerations motivate us to further investigate the relationship between the likelihood and clus-
tering of ADR issuance activity and past and future abnormal currency returns using Poisson regressions.
The Poisson approach allows us to address explicitly those shortcomings in the event study methodology.
The results from the Poisson analysis show that non-U.S. companies display economically and statistically
significant timing ability in the corresponding exchange rate markets over and above any timing ability in
the corresponding equity markets. Specifically, firms tend to issue ADRs after their local currency has been
abnormally strong against the U.S. dollar, and before their local currency becomes abnormally weaker, even
when controlling for past and future performance of the local and U.S. stock markets. The findings from the
Poisson analysis are consistent with the idea that firms have private information to take advantage of their
temporarily high valuations. When the exchange rate returns for a local currency versus the U.S. dollar have
been “abnormally” negative (i.e., when the local currency has been abnormally strong), the valuation of a
local firm in terms of the ADR issuing currency (U.S. dollar) is likely to be high as well, ceteris paribus for
its valuation in the local currency. In other words, when a local currency is abnormally appreciating versus
the U.S. dollar, the existing local shareholders are more likely to gain through an ADR issue, since the latter
is conceptually equivalent to a short position not only in the local equity but also in the local currency.
This interpretation is prima facie puzzling in light of the current state of the exchange rate literature.
After all, what private information could foreign firms possibly have that other market participants wouldn’t?
Yet, additional investigation provides further support for it. First, currency markets are less efficient than
commonly thought. Second, we find that currency market timing ability is strongest exactly when, consistent
with our intuition above, foreign firms would possess the greatest potential informational advantage, e.g.,
when they raise capital through their ADR issuances, during financial crises, in emerging markets, or when
their business is most sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Lastly, our evidence is robust to a wide array
of alternative specifications of our basic methodology.
First, temporary mispricings are rife in international financial markets due to various tangible and in-
tangible frictions and imperfections, such as barriers to capital flows, borrowing and shorting constraints,
information asymmetry and heterogeneity, “home bias,” market segmentation, etc.6 In addition, most
6There is a vast literature documenting these phenomena (e.g., French and Poterba (1991); Bekaert (1995); Bekaert and
Harvey (2002); Tesar and Werner (1995); Bertaut and Kole (2004); Yuan (2005)). Consistently, many empirical studies of
exchange rate dynamics suggest that the covered interest parity holds for short-term interest rates (e.g., Clinton (1988)), yet
find little or no support for the uncovered interest parity (e.g., Froot and Thaler (1990)) or the covered interest parity at
longer maturities (e.g., Popper (1993)). According to Pasquariello (2008), inefficiencies and market segmentation are even more
pronounced during financial crises. Shleifer (2000) surveys the literature on why mispricings are not always arbitraged away in
capital markets.
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nominal exchange rates against the U.S. dollar are very volatile. These fluctuations are often driven by
political considerations, by the actions of price manipulators like Central Banks and other large speculators
(e.g., Pasquariello (2007, Forthcoming) and references therein), as well as by the existence of exchange rate
regimes. These features may in turn offer foreign firms significant opportunities to time their corresponding
currency markets.
Second, we are interested in determining which foreign firms may possess ex ante, and display ex post
greater ability to time the exchange rate market in issuing ADRs. To that purpose, we conduct a natural
experiment. Specifically, we split our sample into two subsets made of either capital raising (i.e., Level III)
or non-capital raising (i.e., Level II) ADR issues. We find strong evidence of currency market timing ability
within the sample made of capital-raising ADRs, but no evidence of currency market timing ability within the
control sample made of non-capital raising ADRs. Our evidence on currency market timing is economically
significant as well, since it translates into total savings for the issuing firms of about $646 million (or 1.86%
of the total capital raised via ADRs) over a one-year horizon surrounding the ADR issue dates. These results
have two important implications for our analysis. For one, they suggest that foreign firms issuing ADRs
exhibit greater currency timing ability when they have stronger incentives to do so, i.e., when such an ability
has the potential to translate into monetary savings. In addition, these results suggest that our inference
is unaffected by why those firms pursue cross-listings in the first place. There is an extensive literature on
this subject. Karolyi (1996, 2006) and Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) provide extensive
surveys. Within this literature, ADR issues have been motivated by liquidity, cost of capital, visibility,
signaling, and corporate governance considerations, among others. Any of these motivations may interact
with exchange rate dynamics around ADR issue dates, thus potentially biasing our inference. However, since
those motivations behind cross-listings are potentially relevant for both firms raising capital via ADRs and
firms that do not, lack of evidence of currency timing ability only for the latter suggests that our inference
is unbiased.
We further divide our sample of firms into different groups based on median issue magnitude, median
issuing firm size, Tobin’s q, and industry, as well as the identity of the issue underwriter, and study the
currency timing of ADR issue decisions for each resulting subset. We find that our market timing result is
largely driven by relatively big issues by relatively small firms (although those firms are large in absolute
terms, especially in emerging markets), issues by firms of relatively low q, issues by firms with higher currency
exposure, and issues by manufacturing firms. Relatively large ADR issues are more economically significant
for relative small firms, thus exchange rate return timing is more crucial to their capital structure decisions.
The investment opportunity set of low q firms is relatively small, and their market valuations relatively more
stable. Hence, the effect of the exchange rate on their valuations in the issuing currency is relatively more
important, making them more selective in choosing the timing of an ADR issue. Firms whose valuations are
more sensitive to local currency fluctuations prior to their ADR issuance may possess a deeper understanding
of the currency market, hence may display greater currency timing ability when issuing ADRs. Consistently,
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manufacturing firms, which are more likely to be export-oriented, may develop a greater understanding of
fundamentals driving the relevant exchange rates and use this skill to time the currency market. We also
find no evidence that this ability can be attributed to the underwriting investment banks, further suggesting
that it is instead intrinsic to the issuing firms.
Lastly, we show that our evidence is robust to several alternative specifications of our empirical strategies.
For example, we consider event windows and currency holding-period returns of up to six months before
and after ADR issuances to account for different firms’ timing horizons. We find that firms’ market timing
ability is generally, albeit not homogeneously, significant across all of those intervals. Our basic evidence is
even stronger during the occurrence of financial crises and controlling for the timing of market integration.
Intuitively, crisis periods are characterized by more intense mispricing; hence currency market timing skills
are more valuable to corporations. We also estimate our models for different groups of countries depending
on geographical proximity or stage of economic development. Currency market timing ability reveals to
be especially relevant, and especially significant for emerging market companies. This reflects the greater
importance of exchange rate fluctuations in their issuance decisions.
Overall, this additional evidence on the relationship between currency timing ability and firm-level,
issuance, regional, and economic characteristics make our basic result more intuitively convincing. Yet, this
result also raises a further question: If, in fact, managers of these firms had private information about future
exchange rates, why wouldn’t they simply trade on this information (or even concentrate exclusively on this
activity) instead of just issuing ADRs (or keep pursuing their core business activity)? After all, the total
savings reported above would be much greater if these companies could divert more capital to time the
exchange rate market. There are several reasons why they may not do so. First, the information advantage
that may explain firms’ currency timing ability could stem from their core business activity. For example,
Evans and Lyons (2005) argued that private information about macroeconomic news originates from micro-
level dispersed information about production technologies. Without those production technologies, firms
would have no information advantage in the currency market. Second, that information advantage may
be occasional, i.e., neither long-lasting nor recurrent enough to warrant its systematic exploitation. Third,
in this study we argue neither that foreign firms use their currency timing ability exclusively when issuing
ADRs nor that exploiting their ability is the most important benefit of those issuances. The literature has
identified many such benefits (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009)), and some of them are
arguably greater than any monetary savings from foreign firms’ ability to time the local exchange rate.
Instead, in this study we concentrate on those firms’ ADR issuances because this activity may allow us
to empirically identify that ability. Fourth, currency market timing is inherently risky as compared to
riskless arbitrage opportunities. Lastly, there may be several capital market frictions (e.g., transaction costs,
borrowing constraints, or taxes) preventing foreign firms from fully exploiting their timing ability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides summary
statistics on ADR issuances and currency and stock returns. Section 3 investigates foreign firms’ currency
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market timing ability by examining their ADR issuance decisions and performing several robustness checks.
Section 4 studies the relation between issue and firm characteristics and firms’ timing ability in the exchange
rate market. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Issue Statistics
ADRs are dollar-denominated negotiable certificates representing a specific number of a foreign company’s
local shares held on deposit in the issuer’s domestic market. Consistent with the discussion in the previous
section, there are two types of ADR issuances in our sample: Level III and Level II ADRs. Level III ADRs
are depositary receipts issued over new local equity, i.e., they raise new capital for the issuing firm. Hence, we
label these issuances CR (Capital Raising) ADRs. Since CR ADRs are sold in a public offering, they have to
meet the most stringent regulatory and listing requirements with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the chosen exchange (either NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ). In contrast, Level II ADRs are depositary
receipts issued over existing local equity, i.e., they do not raise new capital for the issuing firm. We therefore
label them non-capital raising (non-CR) ADRs.
To construct the database used in analysis, we start by including all public CR and non-CR ADR
issues in the U.S. that were registered with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1976 and
2003 in Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum tapes. Notably, we do not include Level I and Rule 144A
ADRs, as well as GDR in our sample. This choice is based on the following argument. First, Level I
ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, and GDRs are subject to more diverse registration and reporting requirements
than those for Level II and Level III ADR issuances. To begin with, Level I ADRs are non-capital-raising
issuances traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, while Rule 144A ADRs raise capital by being
privately placed to sophisticated institutional investors. Further, both programs require little or no review
by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC), and the foreign issuing firms are exempt from U.S. reporting
requirements under Rule 12g3-2(b). Lastly, GDR programs allow issuers to raise capital in two or more equity
markets (including the U.S.) simultaneously, as well as in the Rule 144A private market. Hence, because of
their heterogeneous nature, registration and reporting requirements for GDR issuers may vary considerably
depending on the specific structure of the U.S. offering.7 In contrast to Level I ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, and
GDRs, both Level II and Level III ADR programs must comply with a similar set of stringent registration
and reporting requirements, such as Form F-6 (registration statement), Form F-20 (financial disclosure), and
the timely submission of US GAAP-reconciled financial statements to the SEC.8 Second, according to the
literature, regulatory requirements underlie most of the extant explanations for why foreign firms cross-list
7For a detailed description of these features see Karolyi (1996) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999).
8Level III ADR programs further require the submission to the SEC of Form F-1 to register the equity securities underlying
the ADRs publicly offered in the U.S. for the first time.
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in the U.S. Therefore, firms issuing Level II and Level III ADRs are more likely to be motivated by a similar
set of considerations while the motivations behind Level I, Rule 144A, or GDR programs are more likely to
be diverse. As a result, inference drawn upon comparing currency market timing ability within either Level
II or Level III ADR issuances is less likely to be biased than if drawn upon a larger database including Level
I ADRs, Rule 144A ADRs, or GDRs.9
We further restrict our sample to countries with at least five ADR issues over the sample period, since
too few issues from a country may indicate the existence of significant barriers to raising capital in the U.S.
stock market. These barriers may in turn hinder the local firms’ ability to time the currency market through
ADR issues. We also exclude countries adopting fixed exchange rate regimes over the sample period.10
Nonetheless, the inference that follows is robust to the inclusion of both sets of countries in our sample. In
the end we are left with 353 ADR issues from 20 countries.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for these issues. In the sample there are 167 ADR issues from
firms in G7 countries, 95 from firms in other developed countries, and 91 from firms in emerging economies.
The United Kingdom is the country with the most ADRs issued in the U.S., with 89, followed by Mexico
with 40. More than 65% of the ADRs issued from G7 countries are CR ADRs; this percentage is slightly
higher for firms from emerging markets. Table 1 also shows that the time between the SEC filing date and
the issue date, known as the “time spent in registration,” varies from firm to firm and from country to
country, with a median duration of about a month for most countries.
Table 1 further reports, for each country, the total ADR issue volume, the median ADR and CR ADR
issue sizes, the relative issue size, firm size, and Tobin’s q before the ADR issue. The volume of each ADR
issue in U.S. dollars is computed as the number of ADRs issued times their issue price as reported in the
SDC Platinum database. Firm size and q values are obtained by matching the issues in the sample with
the COMPUSTAT database. Firm size (market capitalization in U.S. dollars) before the issue is calculated
by multiplying the firm’s average share price over the months prior to the issue (within the same year)
with the corresponding total number of shares outstanding and then adjusting for the local exchange rate
versus the U.S. dollar; relative issue size is the ADR issue amount normalized by firm size. When the ADR
issue coincides with a firm’s initial public offering (IPO), firm size is instead calculated by multiplying the
issue price by the total offering amount in all markets, while the relative issue size is calculated by dividing
the amount issued in the U.S. stock market by the total amount issued in all markets. Finally, a firm’s
q before an ADR offering is computed by dividing the firm’s market capitalization before the issue by its
corresponding book value. For IPO issues, we replace the market price with the issuing price, and the book
value before the issue with the first available book value afterward in COMPUSTAT.
9Our sample choice is also consistent with previous research on the costs and benefits of cross-listings, e.g., Doige, Karolyi,
Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) and references therein.
10These countries are Argentina, China, and Hong Kong, whose currencies were all pegged at some point to the U.S. dollar.
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Not surprisingly, both the total and the median issue size by firms from G7 and other developed countries
are bigger than those from emerging market firms, with the United Kingdom being the country with the
biggest total ADR issue volume ($15,724 million) and Germany being the country with the biggest median
issue size ($701.3 million). Among the emerging economies, Asian companies have the largest offerings, es-
pecially those from South Korea and Taiwan. Issues from Latin America are generally smaller. Interestingly,
ADR issuing firms from emerging countries are bigger on average than their counterparts from G7 and other
developed nations.11 Furthermore, with few exceptions (India and Chile), emerging CR ADR issues are
always larger in size than the corresponding non-CR issues. The opposite is true for issues from developed
economies (with the exception of Norway and Sweden). Finally, and consistently with recent evidence in
Gozzia, Levine, and Schmukler (2008), the median Tobin’s q of ADR issuers is significantly greater than one,
albeit heterogeneously so across our sample.
2.2 Currency and Equity Returns
We complement the above database with monthly exchange rate data. The adoption of a monthly frequency
is not casual. This choice is consistent with the median duration in registration reported in Table 1, i.e., with
a median delay between SEC filing date and issue date of about a month for most countries in the sample.
More important, the monthly frequency allows us to control for market microstructure effects and liquidity
considerations in the exchange rate data. Finally, the monthly frequency allows us to examine firms’ market
timing ability over reasonably long (thus more challenging) periods of time, facilitating the interpretation of
the economic significance of our results.
Monthly exchange rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which collects average
noon market buying prices, with the exception of the Chilean peso and the Israeli shekel. Those exchange
rates, often constrained within bands of fluctuations and allowed to float later in the sample, are obtained
from IFS. The resulting dataset starts from January 1975 for G7 and other developed countries; for emerging
economies, the time series of exchange rates starts from the first month when the local ADR market became
officially available to local issuers.12 The resulting total number of monthly observations for each country is
shown in Column C of Table 2.
Exchange rates are defined as units of local currency per U.S. dollar. We correct the data for such
disruptions as the adoption of the euro for six European Union (EU) countries in 1999 and for Greece in
2001. Hence, exchange rate returns for the euro versus the U.S. dollar are used for these countries after their
respective switching dates. Mean and standard deviations of logarithmic exchange rate returns are reported
in Column A of Table 2, together with first-order autocorrelations (ρ(1)). Average monthly exchange rate
returns among G7 and other developed countries range from −0.31% for the Japanese yen to 0.26% for the
11The ADR issuers from South Korea and Taiwan are quite large compared to ADR issuers from other countries. This
explains their small median relative ADR issue size in the sample.
12These dates are from Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002).
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Italian lira, and among developing economies from 0.25% for Asian countries to more than 100 basis points
for Brazil and Mexico. There is also some evidence of (weak) persistence in currency fluctuations: First-order
autocorrelations are positive and statistically significant, yet never greater than 0.48 (Column A of Table 2).
These facts suggest the need to control for existing trends in these exchange return series. We do so in the
next section.
Finally, our sample includes local and U.S. monthly stock market returns. Logarithmic stock returns are
computed from Datastream’s Total Market Indices for each country in their respective domestic currencies.
Column B of Table 2 reports mean and standard deviation of those market returns over the same interval
as for the corresponding currency returns. As expected, monthly stock market returns are characterized by
significantly lower autocorrelations.
3 Timing Ability in Exchange Rate Markets
The core notion of the market timing theory of capital structure is that companies would raise capital by
issuing overvalued securities (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Within a national context, this argument
translates into firms choosing equity over debt and vice versa (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) or among different
debt maturities (Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003)) according to their perceived relative mispricings.
From an international perspective, the relative overvaluation or undervaluation of the domestic currency
may be crucial as well for firms tapping into foreign capital markets. Hence, the level of the exchange rate at
the time of a security issue is going to affect the ensuing proceeds for the issuing firm. Moreover, since there
is evidence that security mispricing is more pronounced in international financial markets (e.g., Henderson,
Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006)), we would expect those markets to offer greater ex ante market timing
opportunities.
The U.S. market for ADRs represents one of the most important sources of funding for foreign firms (e.g.,
Karolyi (1996); Bailey, Chan, and Chung (2002)). Ceteris paribus for its funding needs and valuation in the
corresponding local currency, one such firm could maximize the U.S. dollar proceeds of its ADR offering if
able to execute the issue around the time when its local currency is or has been “abnormally” strong and/or
before its local currency is going to be “abnormally” weak. The first objective of this paper is to test for the
existence of this ability. More specifically, the main hypothesis we test in this study is whether foreign firms
consider currency market conditions in their ADR issuance decisions and, in doing so, display some ability
to time the exchange rate market. In other words, we intend to test whether exchange rate returns follow a
pattern around ADR issue dates consistent with the above considerations, i.e., whether ADR issues can be
predicted by exchange rate returns before their occurrence and whether ADR issues can predict exchange
rate fluctuations afterward.
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We employ two methodologies to investigate the currency market timing abilities of firms. The first is a
traditional event study approach where we examine cumulative abnormal exchange rate returns around ADR
issue dates. The second is a Poisson analysis where we investigate the relationship between the likelihood
and clustering of ADR issues and exchange rate returns over different investment horizons. We describe
these methodologies and our ensuing results below.
Before proceeding, a potential concern must be addressed. A firm should be deemed to have timing
ability in the exchange rate market only if quickly reacting to or anticipating currency fluctuations that
could not be predicted by time trends and/or time-series models. The latter would be the case, for instance,
of a currency in a slow but prolonged depreciation/appreciation process against the U.S. dollar (such as in
“crawling” managed floating regimes). These exchange rate movements, being already expected, may also
be already priced into ADR offerings by the equity market, thus giving the issuing firm little incentive and
opportunity to time the currency market. Therefore, we argue that the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on
firms’ decisions of when to issue ADRs should be limited to its unexpected components. By removing these
trends in exchange rate returns, we attempt to isolate the market timing decision from those considerations,
and simultaneously provide a tighter benchmark against which exchange rate market timing ability can be
detected.
Thus, we detrend all the exchange rate returns for each country n in our sample according to the following
AR(2) model with a time trend:
exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt+ nt, (1)
where exrretnt is the logarithmic exchange rate return for the currency of country n against the U.S. dollar
over month t. In Table 2, we report the corresponding R2 from the estimation of Eq. (1) and the Box-Ljung
statistic (computed up to lag 6) for the resulting series of estimated currency and stock return residuals
nt. Overall, Eq. (1) appears to be successful in removing the predictable component of exchange rate and
equity returns: The null hypothesis that the detrended exchange rate series (nt in Eq. (1)) is white noise
cannot be rejected in all cases except Chile, Israel, and New Zealand. Similarly, the detrended local stock
return series resemble white noise series as well, with the sole exception of India. In addition, estimates
for the first order autocorrelation of nt, not reported here, are statistically indistinguishable from zero for
all detrended currency and stock market returns in our sample. Finally, the R2 from the estimation of
Eq. (1) for exrretnt is generally small, ranging from 3% (Israel) to 32% (South Korea). This suggests that
the unexpected portion of monthly exchange rate fluctuations, i.e., unexplained by Eq. (1), is nonetheless
economically significant.13
This detrending procedure has no bearing on the results below. In fact, these results are even stronger
when we measure firms’ currency timing ability with respect to the undetrended exchange rate series. In
13As expected, the R2 from the estimation of Eq. (1) for local and U.S. stock market returns is instead much lower, ranging
between 0.9% (Mexico) and 11% (Chile).
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alternative to Eq. (1), we could have employed a structural model of exchange rate determination. For
example, currency dynamics have been related to interest rate differentials, purchasing power parity (PPP),
budget and current account deficits/surpluses, or relative GDP growth. Yet, most empirical evidence shows
that macroeconomic fundamentals do not explain monthly exchange rate changes (see Meese and Rogoff
(1983a)). According to Evans and Lyons (2005), the currency determination puzzle is “the most researched
puzzle in international macroeconomics.” This motivates our choice of a model-free approach to control for
the predictable component of exchange rate dynamics in this study.
3.1 Event Study Analysis
We start by analyzing the behavior of exchange rate returns in proximity of ADR issuance dates (as in
Foerster and Karolyi (1999)) using a standard event study methodology. More specifically, for any j ∈
[−H,H] and for any country n, we estimate the following model:
nt = α+
H∑
j=−H
δjInt(j) + ηnt, (2)
where nt are the detrended currency returns from Eq. (1) and Int(j) is a dummy variable defined as:
Int(j) =
1 if there is at least one ADR issue in country n in month t+ j,0 otherwise.
The choice of an appropriate event window (i.e., H) in Eq. (2) is important, yet difficult to make. To help
us capture evidence of currency market timing ability, such windows must include foreign firms’ investment
horizons in timing exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, those horizons could be different across firms,
nations, or regions. We balance these considerations by adopting a relatively long estimation window of
H = 6 months prior to and after each ADR issuance event in the sample. However, the results that follow
are robust, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to alternative choices for H.14 The estimated coefficient δj
in Eq. (2) represents the average marginal (i.e., monthly), abnormal exchange rate return j months before
(if j > 0) or j months after (if j < 0) an ADR issue from a firm in country n. Therefore, successive sums
of those dummy coefficients can be interpreted as measures of the cumulative abnormal impact of ADR
issuances on exchange rates. For example,
∑6
j=−3 δj is a proxy for the cumulative abnormal impact of ADR
issuances on the corresponding exchange rate return from 6 months before the event occurred up to 3 months
14When implementing the analysis in Section 3 for H = 12, 24, 36, we found little or no evidence of currency market timing
ability over those longer horizons. This is not surprising, since it is unlikely that firms would display longer-run currency timing
ability over detrended exchange rate returns series. These additional estimations, available on request, should nonetheless be
interpreted with caution, for longer windows considerably shrink the sample of available ADR issues, especially by emerging
market companies.
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afterward. We estimate Eq. (2) using the pooled data of ADRs from all countries and report the resulting
estimated cumulative coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in Figure 1, together with their 95% confidence intervals.
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In the top panel of Figure 1, cumulative abnormal exchange rate returns display a U-shape pattern around
ADR issue dates, i.e., they decrease before ADR issuances and increase afterward. This pattern is due to
point estimates of the marginal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns (δj) being first negative and
then positive. Before ADR issues, exchange rate returns are below their trend, i.e., local currencies are on
average relatively strong against the U.S. dollar; following ADR issues, exchange rate returns are instead
above their trend, i.e., the local currencies are on average relatively weak against the U.S. dollar, eventually
reverting to pre-event trend levels. Interestingly, the above pattern is centered around one month before the
ADR issue month; this is consistent with the average lag between ADR filing dates and issue dates of 28
days reported in Table 1.
We further analyze the extent of currency market timing ability across the two subsets of our sample
made of only capital raising (CR) and non-capital raising (non-CR) ADR issues, respectively. Recall that
CR ADRs represent new equity issued and non-CR ADRs instead represent existing local equity. Ex ante,
we expect the former (218 in our sample) to exhibit the greatest timing ability, since CR issues are a crucial
source of capital for the issuing corporation and as a result currency movements could have a significant
impact on the amount raised. By contrast, non-CR ADRs (the remaining 135 in our sample) generate no
net revenue for the issuing firm by definition.
More important, non-CR ADRs allow us to address potential omitted variable biases in our empirical
analysis. Specifically, as previously mentioned, foreign companies may issue ADRs for a variety of reasons,
such as to expand their shareholders’ base, to reduce their cost of capital, to gain greater international
visibility, to increase liquidity, to signal quality, or to commit to improve governance (see Doidge, Karolyi,
Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) for a review). Our empirical methodology does not explicitly control for any
of these considerations. However, we account for their presence by estimating the extent of currency market
timing ability across CR and non-CR issuances separately, since these considerations should apply to both.
Therefore, evidence of timing ability in the CR group and lack thereof in the non-CR group would suggest
that these potential biases do not affect our inference.
The resulting patterns (in the bottom panel of Figure 1) are striking: Cumulative abnormal currency
returns around CR ADR issue dates display a much more pronounced U-shape profile than for the whole
sample while no such evidence is found in the control sample made of non-CR ADRs. This suggests that i)
firms display the greatest currency market timing ability when raising capital, i.e., when such ability is most
valuable and translates into monetary savings for the issuing firms, and that ii) such timing ability cannot
be attributed to omitted variable biases in our empirical analysis.
15In this study, we do not measure currency market timing ability at the country level, since the number of ADR issuances
in each of the markets in our sample (in Table 1) is often not large enough to allow for meaningful statistical inference.
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The evidence presented so far is consistent with foreign firms successfully attempting to maximize their
expected proceeds from ADR issuances by timing issue dates according to exchange rate fluctuations, hence
consistent with those firms possessing market timing ability in their local currency markets. Supply imbal-
ance and signaling considerations cannot explain this result. The former, which stem from the imperfect
substitutability of assets denominated in different currencies, would cause the local currencies to appreciate
versus the U.S. dollar in response to the sale of significant U.S. dollar amounts from ADR proceeds (hence
a reverse U-shape pattern), contrary to our evidence of post-issuance depreciation displayed in Figure 1.
Moreover, ADR volumes, albeit significant, are much smaller than the average daily volume of trading in
most of the currencies under examination (e.g., BIS (2008)). The latter is also incompatible with the ob-
served U-shaped patterns in exchange rate returns, since ADR issuances represent good (rather than bad)
news for domestic economies.
It is important to show that our finding of firms’ currency market timing ability is not subject to the
aggregate pseudo market timing bias described by Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005, 2006). Pseudo market
timing, in our context, is the tendency for foreign firms to issue ADR following a run-up in their currencies.
In a small sample, pseudo currency market timing could give the appearance of genuine currency market
timing. Yet, according to Stambaugh (1986, 1999), this bias, also known as small sample predictive regression
bias, is most severe when the sample size is small, predictors are persistent, and their innovations are highly
correlated with returns. These conditions do not pertain to our empirical analysis. First, our sample
is relatively large (monthly return observations around 353 ADR issues in 20 countries over 28 years).
Second, the regressors we employ here are event dummy variables (Int(j) in Eq. (2)) rather than persistent
aggregates such as equity and debt issue volumes, dividend initiations, or corporate investments.16 Third,
Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2004) show that the bias introduced by aggregate pseudo market timing is
of small empirical relevance (e.g., only about one percent of the predictive power of the equity share in new
issues). Nevertheless, to further analyze the robustness of our results, we compute confidence intervals for
cumulative abnormal currency returns using a nonparametric bootstrap procedure in which we randomly
draw returns from the sample with replacement. The resulting 90% confidence bands constructed from
bootstrapped standard errors and centered around zero (also reported in Figure 1) suggest that the most
significant pattern is around CR ADR filing dates.
We also test whether firms in different regions or from countries at different stages of economic devel-
opment may have different ability or incentives to time the exchange rate market. To that purpose, we
estimate Eq. (2) for the various subsets of nations specified in Table 1: G7 countries, other developed coun-
tries, emerging markets, and, within the latter, emerging Asia and Latin America. We report the resulting
estimated cumulative coefficients in Figure 2, together with their 95% confidence intervals. The plots for our
regional groupings reveal some degree of heterogeneity in currency market timing ability. G7 and emerging
economies (especially in Latin America) display a cumulative excess exchange rate return pattern similar
16We further explore the relationship between the cross-sectional and intertemporal dynamics of those dummy variables and
both currency and equity returns in the Poisson regressions in the next section.
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to the U-shaped one observed for the whole sample. Yet, the sequence of local currency appreciation is
much more dramatic for emerging currencies, i.e., up to almost 2.5% over the six months leading to an ADR
issue. In contrast, exchange rates of other developed nations are relatively flat before ADR issues, but then
depreciate significantly (by almost 1.5%) in the following months. Finally, emerging Asian currencies display
an opposite pattern, for local exchange rates appreciate by about 150 basis points over the last few months
before an ADR issue and are relatively stable afterward.
Overall, this evidence suggests that, not only in aggregate but even within different regions of the world,
foreign firms may be able to time the foreign exchange market by issuing ADRs following a run-up of their
domestic currencies and before a reversion of their trends, especially when issuing unseasoned equity; yet,
the extent of this timing ability seems to vary across regions and markets and statistical significance is not
uniform across event windows.
3.2 Poisson Analysis
The results reported in the previous section suggest the existence of timing ability in the exchange rate
market. However, the event study methodology we employed to generate them suffers from several short-
comings ultimately affecting their statistical significance as well as their interpretation. First, the regressions
of Eq. (2) are univariate, i.e., do not control for other factors affecting the timing of ADR issuances, such
as the dynamics of local and U.S. stock markets. Second, the cumulative abnormal excess currency return
estimates implicitly weigh each monthly marginal coefficient equally, hence preventing us from identifying
firms’ best timing horizons.17 Third, this approach ignores the possibility that multiple ADRs may be issued
in the same month from different firms within the same country. In other words, that information is lost in
regressing exchange rate returns on the dummies around ADR issue dates (Int(j)). Most important, under
the alternative hypothesis that currency market timing ability is present, ADR issue dates are endogenous to
past and/or future exchange rate dynamics. A sufficiently large window around each event date, as well as
time trends and lagged dependent variables (in Eq. (1)), may attenuate but not eliminate this endogeneity
problem.
To address these issues directly, we employ an alternative methodology. More specifically, we estimate
the effect of both abnormal currency and (local and U.S.) stock holding-period returns on the probability
(thus the timing) of the ADR issue decision via a Poisson regression model. Poisson regressions allow us to
test for firms’ timing ability over different investment horizons while controlling for the clustering of ADR
issues within each month. Consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 1, we would expect the likelihood
of a firm to issue ADRs to be greater after its local currency abnormally appreciated against the U.S. dollar;
17Many factors may affect the firm’s timing horizon in deciding when to issue, i.e., the horizon over which that firm may
time the exchange rate market with an ADR issuance. For example, since the process leading to an ADR issue is lengthy
and cumbersome, a firm may not be able to promptly take advantage of every abnormal exchange rate return opportunity. In
contrast, a firm always has the option not to issue a registered ADR if its exchange rate expectations are not of its liking.
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we also expect more firms to issue ADRs the greater is the past abnormal appreciation of the domestic
currency. Along the same lines, we would expect the likelihood of a firm to issue ADRs to be greater before
its local currency abnormally depreciates against the U.S. dollar; and similarly we also expect more firms to
issue ADRs the greater is the future expected abnormal depreciation of the domestic currency.
We proceed in three steps. First, we compute excess holding period returns over horizons of length
h ∈ [−H,H], labeled adjexrretnt(h), by summing up monthly excess exchange rate returns nt from Eq. (1)
up to and excluding the event month, i.e., adjexrretnt(h<0) =
∑t−1
s=t+h ns for |h|-month horizons before the
event month t and adjexrretnt(h>0) =
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns for h-month horizons after the event month t. Along the
same lines, we compute excess holding period returns for the local stock markets, adjmktretnt(h), and for
the U.S. stock market, adjusrett(h), for each horizon of length h. Second, we assume that the number of
ADR issues from country n in month t, numissuent, follows a Poisson distribution,18
numissuent ∼ Poisson(λnt). (3)
Third, we estimate the following Poisson regression model:
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) +
β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h). (4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) are a generalized linear model which we estimate by maximum likelihood for each horizon
h ∈ [−6, 6], along the lines with the analysis of Section 3.1, except for the contemporaneous holding-period
returns (h = 0). Within this model, a positive and significant estimate of β3 (h) at horizon h < 0 indicates
that ADR issues in country n are more likely in month t when realized excess local currency returns have
been negative over the period t+ h to t− 1, i.e., after the local currency has been abnormally appreciating
for |h| months prior to the event. Vice versa, a positive and significant estimate of β3 (h) at horizon h > 0
indicates that ADR issues in country n are more likely in month t when realized excess local currency returns
over the period t+ 1 to t+ h are positive, i.e., prior to a future abnormal depreciation of the local currency
over h months. We report estimates of Eq. (4) for all countries in the sample and over the two subsets made
of CR and non-CR ADRs in Table 3, and for each regional subset in Table 4.
These results provide additional evidence of the existence of currency market timing ability suggested
by the event study analysis of Section 3.1. Consistent with the patterns presented in Figure 1, estimates
for the exchange rate return coefficients β3 (h) over the whole sample are negative for all windows prior to
ADR issuances and mostly statistically significant, and positive for all windows afterward, albeit statistically
significant only for three- and six-month horizons (Panel A of Table 3). This suggests that firms in our sample
are able to issue ADRs neither “too early” nor “too late” relative to the dynamics of the local currency market.
18This assumption is reasonable since the sample average for numissuent is very close to its sample variance for each of the
countries in our database and over the entire set of ADR issue events.
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Further, and again consistent with the analysis in Section 3.1, CR ADR issues are significantly more likely
than non-CR ADR issues to occur after an excess appreciation of and before an excess depreciation of the
local currency (Panels B and C of Table 3). In particular, the estimated coefficients for excess holding-period
currency returns, β3(h) in Eq. (4), are negative and statistically significant at all horizons prior to (h < 0
except when h = −4), and positive and statistically significant at all horizons following (h > 0) CR ADR
issue dates (Panel B of Table 3). In contrast, β3(h) is always statistically indistinguishable from zero around
non-CR issue dates (Panel C of Table 3).19
As in Section 3.1, we compute non-parametrically bootstrapped p-values for each of the estimated pa-
rameters of Eq. (4) to analyze the robustness of the above results. These p-values, also reported in Table 3,
reinforce our earlier inference on the existence of firms’ timing ability in currency markets. Additionally, our
regressors, i.e., the detrended currency and local and foreign equity returns, do not display persistence, which
according to Stambaugh (1986, 1999) would increase the severity of the small-sample predictive-regression
bias. Therefore, our Poisson analysis is not susceptible to the aggregate pseudo market timing bias raised
by Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005, 2006).
The evidence in Table 3 further suggests that the likelihood of ADR issuances is affected not only by prior
abnormal local currency returns but also by the prior abnormal performance of foreign firms’ local stock
markets. Specifically, we find that estimates for the coefficient β1(h) in Eq. (4) for some horizons preceding
ADR issuances are positive and statistically significant for both the whole sample and the subsample of
NON-CR ADRs (Panels A and C of Table 3). These estimates indicate that foreign firms are more likely
to issue ADRs following an abnormal run-up in their local stock market. This evidence is weaker for the
subsample of CR ADRs (Panel B of Table 3), as well as with respect to the prior abnormal performance of
the U.S. stock market (the coefficients β2(h) in all panels of Table 3). Hence, foreign firms appear to be much
less sensitive to the dynamics of the U.S. stock market prior to their issuance decision. These results are
largely consistent with the market timing literature in the U.S. equity market (Baker and Wurgler (2002))
and in international equity markets (Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), Henderson, Jegadeesh, and
Weisbach (2006)). Nonetheless, it is important to note that in contrast to our currency market timing
results described above, we find no evidence of abnormal dynamics in either the U.S. or any local stock
market following Level II and Level III ADR issuances.
Our Poisson analysis also shows that the extent of the currency market timing ability varies greatly
across regions, as in Figure 2. For example, only short-term run-ups of the local currency (i.e., one- and
two-month horizons) significantly affect the likelihood of G7 firms to issue ADRs (Panel A of Table 4).
In contrast, ADR issues from firms in other developed countries appear to be more likely only prior to
abnormal local currency depreciations over similarly short windows (Panel B of Table 4). Currency market
19Country-specific factors, such as privatizations and political considerations, may have driven some foreign firms’ ADR
issuance decisions over our sample period, hence may have determined their timing either regardless of or in accordance with
the dynamics of the local currencies. Nonetheless, the addition of country-level dummies to the specification of Eq. (4) did not
meaningfully affect our inference. These results are available from the authors on request.
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timing ability is even more pronounced when Eq. (4) is estimated across the subsamples of emerging market
issuers, although largely limited to the decision to defer the ADR issuance (Panels C, D, and E of Table
4). More specifically, the ADR decision of these firms follows past abnormal local currency appreciations,
yet appears to be independent from future abnormal currency depreciations, as in Figure 2, except over the
longest horizon (Panel C of Table 4). Intuitively, depreciation risk versus the U.S. dollar is often higher for
emerging currencies; thus, valuation risk is often higher for emerging market firms as well, making foreign
exchange market timing ability especially crucial for their issuing activity. Lastly, ADR issues appear to be
preceded by an abnormally positive performance of the corresponding local stock markets in most of the
regions in our sample (i.e., β1(h) > 0 for some h < 0 in most panels of Table 4), consistent with Table 3.
A notable exception is represented by Latin American firms, which seem to prefer to issue ADRs following
local market downturns (β1(h) < 0 for h < 0 in Panel E of Table 4). This suggests that Latin American
companies assign greater weight to currency rather than local equity market dynamics in making their ADR
issuance decisions.
Over which horizon is exchange rate market timing more successful? In other words, which of the 12
holding-period returns around the event date t in the corresponding 12 estimations of Eq. (4) across the
selected country groupings is the most relevant in explaining the likelihood of ADR issues to take place in
month t? To address this question, we could compare the magnitude of the resulting estimated coefficients
β3(h) across horizons of different length h. A word of caution is, however, necessary. We should keep in mind
that the coefficients β3(h) are estimated for holding-period returns computed over those different windows
h. An adequate comparison therefore requires that each coefficient estimate be divided by the corresponding
horizon length h. When doing so, we find that the average monthly effects are strongest in the immediate
proximity of issues (|h| = 1). Hence, foreign firms seem to be most focused on the behavior of their local
currencies one month prior to the ADR issuance and most successful in anticipating their reversal within
one month afterward.
Interestingly, when examining the estimated coefficient for our set of control variables, we find strong
evidence of foreign firms’ timing ability in their local stock market, and (more surprisingly, albeit weakly)
in the U.S. stock market as well. According to Tables 3 and 4, ADR issues in the past 28 years were more
likely when local and U.S. stock market returns had been abnormally high, i.e., after short or long periods
of excessively high market valuations. These results are largely consistent with the market timing literature
in the U.S. equity market (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and for international equity markets (Foerster and
Karolyi (1999), Miller (1999), Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006)). A noteworthy exception is
represented by Latin American firms, which seem to prefer to issue ADRs following local market downturns
(i.e., β1(h) < 0 for h < 0 in Panel E of Table 4). This suggests that Latin American companies assign greater
weight to currency rather than local equity market dynamics in making their ADR issuance decisions.
The evidence in Tables 3 and 4 nests naturally into the above literature. Generally speaking, these
papers suggest that firms should and will take advantage of their relatively high valuations in domestic and
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international capital markets. Yet, currency timing represents an alternative (and, in some cases, dominant,
as in Latin America) set of considerations made by foreign firms when selecting their international capital
structure. According to Tables 3 and 4, when local currencies abnormally appreciate relative to the issuing
currency of ADRs, the U.S. dollar, foreign firms expect abnormally high valuations of their assets in U.S.
dollars, i.e., abnormally high proceeds from ADRs, and, regardless of prior and expected stock market
performance, are more likely to issue them.
3.3 Market Timing: Crises and Integration
The evidence presented so far indicates that foreign exchange market timing is especially significant, both
economically and statistically, for emerging market firms. Yet, both Figure 1 and Table 3 also reveal that such
ability seems to be limited to the recognition of periods of excess appreciation of the local currency prior to
ADR issuance events. By contrast, issuers from developed economies display currency market timing ability
by expediting their ADR issuances as well. What are the reasons for this apparent dichotomy? Academics
and practitioners agree that emerging financial markets differ from their developed counterparts, either
for the nature of the trading activity, their institutional features, sensitivity to broad market fluctuations,
dependence on foreign investments, or degree of liquidity, just to name a few. Do any of these market
characteristics explain the currency timing results described above?
We address this issue in this section. More specifically, we examine the robustness of our market timing
results to two crucial events affecting the economic and financial well-being of both emerging and developed
countries: financial crises and market integration. We do so because a majority of the emerging countries in
our sample are exposed to these events over a significant portion of our sample period. We start by focusing
on the effect of financial turmoil on our inference. To do so, we first amend the event study model of Eq.
(2) to control for crisis periods as follows:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) +
6∑
j=−6
δ∗j I
∗
nt(j) + ηnt, (5)
where I∗nt(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if any firm in country n issued ADRs in month t + j and
month t+ j is within a crisis period, and zero otherwise. We define our crisis periods as December 1994 to
January 1995 for the Mexican Peso Crisis, July 1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998
to January 1999 for the Russian Crisis.20 In Figure 3 we plot the resulting cumulative abnormal currency
returns in proximity of ADR issues within and outside the crisis periods for each of the regional subsets listed
in Table 1. In particular, the dotted lines represent estimates for Σ6j∈[−6,6]δj , i.e., the cumulative abnormal
currency returns around ADR issues occurring over the portion of the sample period privy of financial crises,
20The use of two sets of dummies in Eq. (5) is necessary since these crisis periods do not span the 13-month event window
around ADR issuances.
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while the solid lines represent estimates for Σ6j∈[−6,6]δj+δ
∗
j , the cumulative abnormal currency returns around
ADR issues occurring during financial crises.
Figure 3 reveals that cumulative abnormal exchange rate returns around ADR issuances are of much
greater absolute magnitude during periods of financial turmoil. More interestingly, especially in comparison
with Figure 1, the U-shape patterns of those return aggregations are more important during crisis periods
than during stable periods. Cumulative abnormal currency returns are now downward sloping prior to ADR
issues and upward sloping afterward for emerging markets in general, but especially for Latin America. Hence,
foreign firms’ currency market timing ability, far from disappearing, is actually stronger in correspondence
with periods of financial turmoil. This is plausible since crisis periods are exactly when this skill is most
valuable to a corporation and mispricing is generally deemed to be most intense. For example, Pasquariello
(2008) found that arbitrage violations are most frequent during periods of international financial instability.
Figure 3 seems to suggest that most foreign companies, but especially those based in Latin America (and, to
a lesser extent, Asia), have been able to effectively account for the likelihood of a currency crisis in choosing
their international capital structure.
To confirm these findings, we modify the Poisson regression model of Eq. (4) by adding a term capturing
the interaction between cumulative abnormal exchange rate holding-period returns and the occurrence of a
crisis. Specifically, we estimate
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + (6)
β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + β4(h)adjexrretnt(h) · Crisist + νnt(h)
where Crisist is a dummy variable equal to one if month t is within a financial crisis period, and zero
otherwise. Table 5 reports estimates for the parameters of the above equation.21 As compared with Table 3,
the coefficients measuring the effect of excess holding period currency returns before (after) ADR issuances
on the likelihood of these issuances to take place during the event month are still negative (positive), mostly
(seldom) significant, and of generally smaller absolute magnitude. Yet, more interestingly (and consistent
with Figure 3), estimates for the additional impact of currency returns on λnt during financial crises, β4(h),
are mostly negative before ADR issues, mostly positive afterward, and of generally greater absolute magni-
tude than the corresponding estimates for β3(h), regardless of the selected timing horizon h. Again, foreign
firms appear to display better currency market timing ability in times of crisis. Not surprisingly, this is
especially true for emerging market companies. The estimated sum of β4(h) and β3(h) for both emerging
Asian and Latin American firms is often negative prior to and often positive following ADR issues. This
suggests that local currencies of emerging market firms possess a superior currency market timing ability in
proximity of crisis periods, i.e., that those firms are on average successful in recognizing the symptoms of an
impending dramatic depreciation of their local currencies and in raising capital accordingly.
21Estimates for the intercept in all the Poisson regressions that follow are similar in sign, magnitude, and statistical significance
to those reported in Table 3. Therefore, these estimates are omitted for economy of exposition.
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Next, we examine the relevance of another important feature of the international financial market, the
ongoing process of financial integration among local economies, for the evidence on currency market timing
ability established above. Over the course of the last three decades, most of the emerging market countries
in our sample have experienced not only those official capital market liberalizations making ADR issuances
possible, but also significant regulatory changes that have furthered their effective financial integration
with the rest of the world. The process of market integration would clearly have a significant impact on the
international capital structure decisions of a firm. The same process also may reasonably affect the likelihood
of foreign companies to issue ADRs, therefore altering the dynamics of the relation between exchange rate
returns and ADR issuances described so far. Hence, we need to test for the robustness of our evidence of
firms’ foreign exchange market timing ability to these implications of market integration. To that purpose,
we amend again the Poisson regression model of Eq. (4) by estimating instead
lnλnt = α(h) + β1 (h) adjmktretnt(h) + β2 (h) adjusrett(h) +
β3 (h) adjexrretnt(h) + β5 (h) INTEGnt + νnt(h), (7)
where INTEGnt is a dummy variable equal to one if, on date t, country n has already experienced a
significant financial integration regime shift, according to the endogenous chronology reported in Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002, Table 3), and zero otherwise.
The resulting coefficient estimates, in Table 6, reveal that, as expected, foreign firms become more active
in the ADR market following the integration of their domestic equity market with the rest of the world:
β5 (h) is positive and strongly significant (at the 1% level or less) in most cases.22 Yet, evidence of timing
ability in the foreign exchange (β3 (h)) and local stock (β1 (h)) markets is unaffected. The introduction
of integration dummies does not alter, but rather often magnifies either sign or economic and statistical
significance of both sets of coefficients over different investment horizons h, namely negative and significant
coefficients prior to and positive and significant coefficients following ADR issuances. To test the robustness
of these findings, we also amend the event study regression of Eq. (2) to account for financial integration by
estimating the following model:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) +
6∑
j=−6
δIj I
I
nt(j) + ηnt, (8)
where IInt is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one firm in country n issued ADRs in month t+ j and
month t + j is past the endogenous financial integration date for country n estimated by Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lumsdaine (2002, Table 3), and zero otherwise. We report the resulting estimates in Figure 4, where
the dotted lines represent estimates for
∑6
j∈(−6,6) δj , i.e., the cumulative abnormal currency returns around
ADR issues occurring before financial integration took place, while the solid lines represent estimates for
22Eq. (7) is estimated only for the subset of the countries in the sample whose market integration dates are later than the
official liberalization dates, i.e., do not overlap with our sample period (e.g., South Korea and Taiwan).
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∑6
j∈(−6,6) δj + δ
I
j , the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR issues occurring after financial
integration. Figure 4 reveals a distinct U-shape pattern for the latter but not for the former. These
dynamics confirm the evidence in Table 6: Currency market timing ability is more pronounced after financial
integration has occurred, especially in emerging markets. Intuitively, fewer barriers to international capital
markets facilitate a company’s efforts at maximizing its proceeds from the issuance of securities to the public.
Therefore, Table 6 and Figure 4 suggest that market integration strengthens, rather than weakens, the basic
finding of our study: Foreign firms display currency market timing ability in issuing ADRs.
Finally, we explore the economic significance of the currency market timing results described above. In
particular, we want to gauge the impact of firms’ currency market timing ability on their bottom line. To that
purpose, we employ the estimated cumulative coefficients from Eq. (2) for capital raising ADR issuances,
plotted in the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 1. We focus on CR ADRs since any currency market timing
ability exhibited in their issuance translates into monetary savings for the issuing firms. Specifically, for
each subset of countries under consideration, we compute the negative of the cumulative abnormal returns
from 6 months before to 1 month before an ADR issue, −∑6j=1 δj , and the cumulative abnormal returns
from 1 month after to 6 months after an ADR issue,
∑−1
j=−6 δj . We then multiply the resulting estimates by
the corresponding median ADR issue size and total ADR issue volume (both from Table 1). The ensuing
numbers, reported in Table 7, represent the average and the total U.S. dollar amounts foreign companies
saved by selling ADRs neither “too early” (if
∑6
j=1 δj < 0) nor “too late” (if
∑6
j=1 δj > 0), respectively. Table
7 shows that this market timing ability is economically significant. Over the sample period, foreign firms
have saved on average about $0.65 million each (i.e., $330 million in total) by deferring their ADR issuances
and $0.62 million each (i.e., $315 million in total) by expediting them. This amounts to economically and
statistically significant savings of about 1.86% of the total capital raised via ADRs over the sample (i.e., $646
million). Not surprisingly, emerging market firms are the biggest beneficiaries, especially in Latin America,
where savings averaged $2.21 million per issue (i.e., for a total of $203 million) over the five-month period
before and $0.98 million per issue (i.e., for a total of $90 million) over the five-month period after their ADR
issuances. These savings are of even greater magnitude when measured during financial crises (Figure 3) or
after controlling for endogenous market integration (Figure 4).
4 Who Times the Exchange Rate Market?
In the previous section, we documented that firms are able to time foreign exchange market through ADR
issues. The evidence is stronger after controlling for the occurrence of financial crises and the timing of market
integration. Moreover, we found that the foreign exchange market timing ability is especially relevant for
emerging market companies. In this section, we investigate further what kind of issuances and firms are
more likely to time the exchange rate market.
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We first examine whether the relative size of an ADR issuance or the size of the ADR issuing firm lead
to differential market timing ability. Specifically, we first divide our sample into four size groups based on
the relative ADR issue size and the relative firm size: (1) BigBig, which includes all large ADR issues (i.e.,
above the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a
country; (2) BigSmall, which includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above median relative ADR issue size) from
small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size); (3) SmallBig, which includes all small ADR issues (i.e.,
below the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a
country; and (4) SmallSmall, which includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue
size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a country. We then re-estimate both the
event study model of Eq. (2) and the Poisson regression model of Eqs. (3) and (4) for each of these four size
groups across all countries in the sample. The results are reported in Figure 5 and Table 8, respectively.
When comparing Panel A of Table 3 to the corresponding results in Table 8, it is clear that the market
timing result documented in Section 3 is driven mostly by relatively big issues from relatively small issuers,
although those firms are large in absolute terms, especially in emerging markets (see Table 1). In particular,
the likelihood of a relatively large ADR issue by a relatively small firm is significantly higher after an abnormal
appreciation (β3(h) < 0 when h < 0 in Panel B of Table 8) and prior to a future abnormal depreciation of
the local currency (β3(h) > 0 when h > 0 in Panel B of Table 8). Intuitively, large ADR issues are more
economically significant for small issuers, thus exchange rate return timing is more crucial to their capital
structure decision. The dynamics of cumulative abnormal returns around ADR issuances across issue and
firm size groups (Figure 5) are consistent with these results, with the BigSmall grouping displaying the most
significant U-shape patterns.23
We then test whether a firm’s investment opportunity set (proxied by Tobin’s q) is an indicator of its
foreign exchange timing ability. We do so by first re-estimating the Poisson regression model of Eq. (4)
separately for firms with above median Tobin’s q, i.e., growth firms, and for firms with below median Tobin’s
q, i.e., value firms, in each of the countries in our sample. The results reported in Table 9 suggest that, on
aggregate, the currency market timing evidence of Section 3 is largely driven by firms with low q. Intuitively,
the investment opportunity set of low q firms is relatively small, and their market valuations relatively more
stable. Hence, the effect of the exchange rate on their valuations in the issuing currency is relatively more
important, making them more selective in choosing the timing of an ADR issue.24 Again, similar results are
obtained from the estimation of the event study model of Eq. (2) across value (low q) and growth (high q)
firms, reported in Figure 6.
23We also estimate both Eqs. (2) and (4) for each of the subsets of countries described in Table 2. The results, available
upon request from the authors, are qualitatively consistent with those reported in Figure 5 and Table 8.
24When estimating Eq. (4) for low and high q firms across each of the regional groups in Table 2, we further find that this
dichotomy in currency market timing ability disappears within emerging markets. This is not surprising, since (as suggested
in Section 3) depreciation risk represents an overriding concern for Latin American and Asian companies issuing ADRs. These
results are available on request from the authors.
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Next, we test whether the currency market timing ability of firms issuing CR ADRs is related to greater
sensitivity of these firms’ business activities to currency fluctuations. To that purpose, we first compare the
currency exposure of issuers of CR ADRs versus non-CR ADRs. We estimate this exposure by the absolute
value of the ”currency γ,” |γi|, from the following regression:
retint = ai + bimktretnt + γiexrretnt + int (9)
where retint is the stock return of the ADR issuing firm i from country n at time t, mktretnt is the return
of the corresponding local stock market, and exrretnt is the corresponding exchange rate return versus the
U.S. dollar. Eq. (9) is estimated over a period of no less than two and no more than five years prior to the
ADR issuing month. This restriction leaves us with a subset of 59 CR ADR and 34 non-CR ADR issuing
firms. We find that the median |γi| for CR ADR issuers (0.52 with a standard error of 0.10) is almost 50%
larger than the corresponding median for non-CR issuers (0.32 with a standard error of 0.23). Hence, the
valuation of CR ADR issuing firms in the two- to five-year period prior to their decision to issue appears
to be more sensitive to fluctuations of their local currency than the valuation of firms eventually issuing
non-CR ADRs. This suggests that CR ADR issuing firms may have developed greater understanding of the
currency market than non-CR ADR issuers prior to their issuance decision. This may in turn translate into
greater currency timing ability when issuing ADRs.
As a further test of this hypothesis, we examine whether there is differential currency market timing ability
across firms in different industries. To that purpose, we divide our sample into the following eight industries
according to SIC codes: Agriculture, Construction, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Sales, Financial, and
Service. Then we estimate both the event study regression model of Eq. (2) and the Poisson model of Eq.
(4) over each resulting industry subset of our sample. We report the corresponding estimates in Figure 7 and
Table 10, respectively.25 Both sets of results indicate that currency market timing ability is most pronounced
among firms in the Manufacturing industry. For instance, only the likelihood of a manufacturing firm to
issue an ADR is both negatively related to past abnormal currency returns (β3(h) < 0 when h < 0 in Panel
B of Table 10) and positively related to future abnormal currency returns (β3(h) > 0 when h > 0 in Panel
B of Table 10). Intuitively, the revenues of these firms are more likely to be generated in foreign markets.
Therefore, their management is more likely either to develop a deeper understanding of the relevant currency
markets, to affect the exchange rate through their business activities, or to lobby for a more favorable currency
policy with the corresponding local government.
Finally, we consider the possibility that the currency market timing ability of foreign firms originates
from the investment banks underwriting the issuances rather than from the foreign firms themselves. To do
so, we first divide our sample of ADR issue firms into subsets according to the identity of the underwriting
institution; then we estimate both Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) across the subsets made of issues managed by
25Neither model could be estimated for the Agriculture and Construction groupings since they covered a total of only five
ADR issues.
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the top six underwriting firms in the U.S.: Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), Goldman Sachs, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Smith Barney.26 The results, reported in Figure 8
and column β3(h) of Table 11, show little or no evidence of currency market timing ability across investment
bank groupings.27 This fact, together with our previous findings, indicates that currency market timing
ability is intrinsic to the issuing firms and not to their advisors.
Overall, the ability of a foreign firm to time the exchange rate market while issuing ADRs appears to
be related to important firm and issue characteristics like size, Tobin’s q, and industry, as well as to the
relative magnitude of the proceeds at stake, but not to the identity of the underwriting investment bank.
This evidence corroborates our basic conclusions from Section 3, since it anchors them to intuitive corporate
finance grounds.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess whether foreign firms can time their corresponding local currency markets by
studying the relationship between exchange rate returns and all ADR issuances in the U.S. in the last 28
years. We provide economically and statistically significant evidence of foreign firms’ timing ability in the
exchange rate market, especially when these firms raise capital through an ADR program. We further show
that currency market timing ability is most pronounced for companies with higher currency exposure, value
companies, manufacturing firms, relatively small (yet large in absolute terms) companies issuing relatively
large amounts of ADRs, and emerging market companies, and especially during currency crises and following
the integration of their domestic market with the rest of the world; yet, this ability cannot be attributed to
the investment banks underwriting the issues.
Our study is the first to document the existence of currency market timing ability. In addition, our
findings also suggest that some market participants in the global foreign exchange market (selected foreign
firms issuing ADRs) may have, at least occasionally, private information about currency movements. Kauf-
mann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005) find that managers of resident firms in emerging markets have private
information about exchange rate movements. The evidence we find in this study is consistent with their
findings. Indeed, firms appear to exploit their private information about exchange rate movements in their
ADR issuance decisions. Thus, timing ability in the exchange rate markets may contribute to interpret
recent evidence on the order flow explaining and predicting exchange rate fluctuations (Evans and Lyons
(2002), (2004), (2008)). Foreign exchange market timing ability in the ADR market entails foreign firms
26We did not include in the analysis ADRs underwritten by other investment banks (representing less than one-third of the
sample) because of the insufficient number of issuances in our sample for each of them separately.
27Specifically, and consistent with the cumulative plots in Figure 8, only ADRs underwritten by Morgan Stanley (55 in
our sample) are more likely to be issued prior to an abnormal depreciation of the local currency: β3(h) > 0 and statistically
significant for h = 1, 3, 4, 6 in the corresponding panel of Table 11. Interestingly, Table 11 also suggests that ADRs are more
likely to be issued following an unexpected run-up of the local equity market when underwritten by Goldman Sachs and Merrill
Lynch.
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either possessing private information about the fundamentals driving the long-term dynamics of their local
currencies, or being able to directly affect those fundamentals. Therefore, any order flow aggregate contain-
ing these companies’ trading activity in the local exchange rate markets, and information about it, would
play such an important role in exchange rate determination.
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Table 5: Poisson Regressions: ADRs and Financial Crises
This table presents the estimates of the following Poisson regressions for 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except
h = 0:lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + β4adjexrretnt(h) · Crisist + νnt(h)
where the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is
the excess holding period local stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess
holding period U.S. stock market return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar
exchange rate return of country n at month t; and Crisist is a dummy variable equal to one if month t is within a financial crisis
period and zero otherwise. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t+ h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t+h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns,
we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt + nt,
where exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency
return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h ns, and the excess holding period currency return from
month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns. Excess holding period local stock market returns, adjmktrett(h),
and excess holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. Crisis periods are defined as December 1994
to January 1995 for the Mexican Peso Crisis, July 1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998 to January
1999 for the Russian Crisis. Panel A reports estimates for the whole sample; Panels B to F report estimates for country groups.
p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel A: All Countries Panel B: G-7 Countries
6 months before 1.52*** 1.01* -1.37 -4.33 1.52*** 0.30 -0.28 -1.84
(0.00) (0.09) (0.13) (0.38) (0.01) (0.74) (0.82) (0.83)
5 months before 1.66*** 1.13* -1.66* -8.33 1.75*** 0.06 -1.16 -4.93
(0.00) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.01) (0.95) (0.40) (0.58)
4 months before 1.53*** 0.82 -1.31 -5.46 1.65** -0.24 -0.70 -2.72
(0.00) (0.27) (0.24) (0.35) (0.03) (0.83) (0.66) (0.76)
3 months before 1.48*** 0.74 -1.71 -6.65 1.46* -0.56 -1.39 -6.47
(0.01) (0.39) (0.20) (0.27) (0.10) (0.66) (0.46) (0.45)
2 months before 1.70*** 1.22 -2.16 -12.64** 1.67 0.37 -3.02 -11.63*
(0.01) (0.25) (0.18) (0.02) (0.12) (0.81) (0.18) (0.09)
1 month before 1.51* 1.83 -5.03** -6.84 -0.20 2.53 -5.51* -4.78
(0.10) (0.21) (0.03) (0.47) (0.89) (0.23) (0.09) (0.73)
1 month after -0.62 1.94 -0.83 9.23*** -1.77 2.86 -2.30 24.17**
(0.51) (0.18) (0.72) (0.00) (0.25) (0.18) (0.48) (0.05)
2 months after 0.44 -0.29 0.92 5.23** -0.15 -0.78 1.94 9.15
(0.52) (0.78) (0.57) (0.05) (0.89) (0.60) (0.40) (0.36)
3 months after 0.25 -0.29 1.01 4.19* 0.75 -0.97 1.32 1.95
(0.64) (0.73) (0.44) (0.07) (0.42) (0.45) (0.48) (0.82)
4 months after 0.15 -0.22 0.86 2.44 0.64 -0.43 1.04 -0.56
(0.75) (0.76) (0.44) (0.34) (0.43) (0.70) (0.51) (0.94)
5 months after 0.06 -0.19 0.93 1.86 0.54 -0.51 1.07 2.84
(0.89) (0.77) (0.35) (0.45) (0.45) (0.62) (0.45) (0.66)
6 months after -0.07 0.21 1.99** 1.11 0.47 -0.18 1.04 2.22
(0.85) (0.72) (0.02) (0.63) (0.47) (0.85) (0.41) (0.71)
continued on next page
35
Table 5 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel C: Other Developed Panel D: Emerging Markets
6 months before 0.87 3.42*** 0.49 9.99 1.31** -0.41 -6.07*** -9.28*
(0.31) (0.01) (0.79) (0.11) (0.02) (0.71) (0.00) (0.09)
5 months before 1.37 3.31** 1.49 9.44 1.25** 0.19 -6.38*** -13.31**
(0.14) (0.02) (0.45) (0.24) (0.03) (0.88) (0.01) (0.03)
4 months before 1.82* 2.39 2.16 11.73 0.79 0.14 -7.06*** -9.99
(0.09) (0.12) (0.33) (0.23) (0.23) (0.92) (0.01) (0.17)
3 months before 3.06*** 1.35 2.74 11.49 0.26 1.03 -8.28*** -7.10
(0.01) (0.46) (0.28) (0.34) (0.74) (0.52) (0.01) (0.38)
2 months before 3.48** -0.39 4.53 9.03 0.42 2.83 -7.72** -10.06
(0.02) (0.86) (0.14) (0.55) (0.66) (0.16) (0.03) (0.25)
1 month before 3.41* 0.11 -1.54 16.43 1.57 2.10 -6.91 -12.95
(0.10) (0.97) (0.73) (0.41) (0.23) (0.44) (0.16) (0.34)
1 month after -0.18 3.80 8.50** 6.29 -0.40 -1.87 -10.19** 17.68***
(0.93) (0.19) (0.05) (0.71) (0.77) (0.48) (0.04) (0.00)
2 months after 2.13 1.37 5.59* 7.17 -0.39 -1.86 -8.49*** 13.07***
(0.16) (0.53) (0.07) (0.55) (0.69) (0.32) (0.01) (0.00)
3 months after 2.09* 1.80 3.10 -8.06 -1.04 -2.28 -5.42* 9.61***
(0.09) (0.32) (0.22) (0.47) (0.19) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01)
4 months after 1.67 0.21 2.18 1.72 -1.02 -1.35 -3.35 5.64
(0.12) (0.89) (0.32) (0.85) (0.14) (0.28) (0.20) (0.11)
5 months after 1.34 0.31 1.33 4.13 -1.02* -0.97 -1.71 2.79
(0.16) (0.82) (0.51) (0.58) (0.10) (0.37) (0.43) (0.42)
6 months after 1.11 0.16 1.66 3.58 -0.85 0.32 2.37 -0.58
(0.20) (0.90) (0.36) (0.60) (0.13) (0.74) (0.11) (0.84)
Panel E: Emerging Asian Panel F: Emerging Latin
6 months before 2.92*** -2.99 0.63 -9.28 0.12 -0.10 -5.71*** -14.34**
(0.00) (0.12) (0.91) (0.47) (0.89) (0.95) (0.01) (0.03)
5 months before 2.96*** -1.64 -6.13 -5.23 -0.52 0.19 -5.49** -18.78***
(0.00) (0.45) (0.37) (0.78) (0.57) (0.90) (0.02) (0.01)
4 months before 3.15*** -3.49 -18.10*** 52.79* -2.03** 0.45 -4.92** -26.85***
(0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.80) (0.05) (0.00)
3 months before 2.04 -0.70 -19.76** 14.21 -2.33** 0.95 -6.46** -20.01**
(0.08) (0.80) (0.02) (0.45) (0.04) (0.64) (0.03) (0.05)
2 months before 1.94 1.84 -25.26*** 13.86 -2.41* 3.29 -5.75* -19.52
(0.14) (0.61) (0.01) (0.47) (0.09) (0.20) (0.09) (0.13)
1 month before 3.18 -2.44 -31.46*** 18.51 -0.56 3.77 -2.89 -29.05
(0.08) (0.62) (0.00) (0.49) (0.80) (0.29) (0.52) (0.18)
1 month after 1.01 -7.29 -21.85* 26.09* -1.23 -0.06 -6.55 13.69**
(0.62) (0.11) (0.06) (0.08) (0.56) (0.99) (0.19) (0.02)
2 months after 0.82 -4.53 -23.80*** 25.94** -1.84 -0.54 -6.05* 11.32**
(0.56) (0.16) (0.01) (0.02) (0.19) (0.83) (0.08) (0.02)
3 months after 0.54 -5.59** -12.99 15.80 -2.61** -0.40 -4.51 8.02**
(0.67) (0.02) (0.15) (0.13) (0.02) (0.84) (0.13) (0.04)
4 months after 0.54 -4.09** -12.32 10.13 -2.77*** -0.10 -3.62 7.77**
(0.62) (0.05) (0.11) (0.40) (0.00) (0.95) (0.13) (0.05)
5 months after 0.69 -3.80** -14.71** 13.61 -2.57*** 0.19 -1.73 3.74
(0.48) (0.04) (0.03) (0.21) (0.00) (0.89) (0.37) (0.34)
6 months after 0.46 -2.12 -14.46*** 12.83 -2.34*** 1.34 1.63 0.70
(0.61) (0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.00) (0.29) (0.25) (0.82)
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Table 6: Poisson Regressions: ADRs and Market Integration
This table presents estimates of the following Poisson regressions for 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:lnλnt =
α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + β4INTEGnt + νnt(h), where the number of ADR
issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local
stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market
return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return of country n
at month t; and INTEGnt is a dummy variable equal to one if, on month t, country n has already experienced a significant
financial integration regime shift, according to the endogenous chronology reported in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002,
Table 3), and zero otherwise. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t+h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t+h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns,
we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt + nt,
where exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency
return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h ns, and the excess holding period currency return from
month t to month t+h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess
holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. Panel A reports results for the whole sample; Panel B
reports estimates for emerging market countries. p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and
(***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β4(h)
Panel A: All Countries Panel B: Emerging Markets
6 months before 1.42*** 1.12* -1.41 0.44*** 1.22** -0.29 -7.10*** 0.72**
(0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.00) (0.02) (0.79) (0.00) (0.04)
5 months before 1.54*** 1.23* -1.80* 0.44*** 1.09* 0.32 -7.63*** 0.71**
(0.00) (0.06) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.79) (0.00) (0.04)
4 months before 1.41*** 0.93 -1.41 0.44*** 0.72 0.17 -8.08*** 0.70**
(0.00) (0.21) (0.20) (0.00) (0.27) (0.90) (0.00) (0.05)
3 months before 1.35*** 0.85 -1.90 0.43*** 0.23 1.10 -9.23*** 0.68**
(0.01) (0.31) (0.14) (0.00) (0.77) (0.49) (0.00) (0.05)
2 months before 1.51** 1.28 -2.82* 0.43*** 0.31 3.17 -8.99*** 0.66*
(0.02) (0.22) (0.08) (0.00) (0.74) (0.11) (0.00) (0.06)
1 month before 1.34 1.89 -5.30** 0.43*** 1.41 2.35 -8.39* 0.63*
(0.13) (0.19) (0.02) (0.00) (0.28) (0.39) (0.07) (0.07)
1 month after -0.79 2.24 2.65 0.45*** -0.57 -0.72 2.40 0.65*
(0.38) (0.11) (0.18) (0.00) (0.67) (0.78) (0.46) (0.07)
2 months after 0.28 -0.05 2.09 0.45*** -0.63 -1.00 -2.36 0.67*
(0.66) (0.96) (0.13) (0.00) (0.52) (0.58) (0.44) (0.06)
3 months after 0.14 -0.08 1.84 0.45*** -1.29* -1.40 -0.19 0.67*
(0.79) (0.92) (0.11) (0.00) (0.10) (0.32) (0.93) (0.06)
4 months after 0.12 -0.09 1.11 0.45*** -1.10* -1.02 -1.40 0.69**
(0.79) (0.90) (0.28) (0.00) (0.10) (0.40) (0.49) (0.05)
5 months after 0.04 -0.07 1.05 0.45*** -1.07* -0.84 -1.18 0.69*
(0.91) (0.91) (0.25) (0.00) (0.08) (0.43) (0.51) (0.05)
6 months after -0.04 0.30 1.96** 0.45*** -0.86 0.26 1.89 0.63*
(0.91) (0.60) (0.02) (0.00) (0.12) (0.79) (0.15) (0.08)
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Table 8: Poisson Regression: ADRs Across Firm and Issue Size
This table presents the estimates of the Poisson regression model across the following four subsets of all firms issuing ADR
in our sample: “BigBig” includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e.,
above the median issuing firm size) in a country; “BigSmall” include all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median relative ADR
issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a country; “SmallBig” includes all small ADR issues
(i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a country; and
“SmallSmall” includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the
median issuing firm size) in a country. The Poisson regression models for 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h), where the number of ADR issues
from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock
market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market return
in month t for an event window h; and adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return of country n at
month t. Excess returns are comupted with detrended returns as in Table 6. An event window is defined either as |h|-month
before the observation month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t + h] when
h > 0). p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Panel A: BigBig Panel B: BigSmall
6 months before 2.35** -0.77 0.67 1.45** 1.71** -4.33***
(0.04) (0.68) (0.81) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
5 months before 2.54** 0.59 0.28 1.34** 1.78** -5.10***
(0.04) (0.78) (0.93) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
4 months before 1.17 0.44 1.34 0.97 1.40 -4.14***
(0.43) (0.85) (0.69) (0.14) (0.17) (0.01)
3 months before 1.80 -1.08 1.41 0.91 1.09 -4.88***
(0.29) (0.69) (0.72) (0.22) (0.35) (0.01)
2 months before 2.03 0.62 -0.41 1.07 2.19 -6.24***
(0.32) (0.85) (0.93) (0.24) (0.13) (0.01)
1 month before 2.57 -0.25 -0.62 0.54 3.24 -7.28**
(0.36) (0.96) (0.93) (0.67) (0.11) (0.02)
1 months after -2.82 3.74 -2.20 -1.22 3.60* 5.18**
(0.340) (0.40) (0.75) (0.34) (0.07) (0.04)
2 months after -2.38 4.74 0.39 0.13 -0.33 3.62**
(0.26) (0.15) (0.93) (0.89) (0.81) (0.05)
3 months after -0.41 0.78 1.28 -0.36 1.51 3.58**
(0.81) (0.77) (0.74) (0.64) (0.20) (0.02)
4 months after -0.59 2.93 2.8 -0.12 1.06 2.33*
(0.69) (0.21) (0.35) (0.85) (0.30) (0.09)
5 months after -0.47 1.70 2.25 -0.56 0.95 2.23*
(0.73) (0.42) (0.42) (0.33) (0.30) (0.07)
6 months after -0.49 2.21 1.13 -0.41 1.60** 4.41***
(0.69) (0.25) (0.67) (0.43) (0.05) (0.00)
Panel C: BigSmall Panel D: SmallSmall
6 months before 1.37*** 1.34 -1.25 2.22* -1.23 0.07
(0.01) (0.12) (0.33) (0.10) (0.57) (0.98)
5 months before 1.36** 1.26 -1.30 3.02** -2.02 0.61
(0.02) (0.19) (0.35) (0.04) (0.40) (0.86)
4 months before 1.13* 1.13 -0.90 3.66** -3.63 -3.43
(0.09) (0.29) (0.57) (0.02) (0.17) (0.41)
3 months before 1.42* 1.20 -2.72 3.11* -3.15 -5.76
(0.07) (0.33) (0.15) (0.10) (0.30) (0.24)
2 months before 1.68* 1.30 -4.42** 4.12* -3.7 -2.85
(0.07) (0.39) (0.05) (0.06) (0.31) (0.62)
1 month before 2.82** 1.45 -6.54** 2.97 -3.31 -7.09
(0.03) (0.49) (0.04) (0.36) (0.52) (0.38)
1 month after 0.78 1.83 0.73 -0.73 -4.65 1.57
(0.56) (0.37) (0.81) (0.83) (0.35) (0.84)
2 months after 1.94** -0.78 0.60 -2.39 -1.73 -2.29
continued on next page
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Table 8 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
(0.04) (0.60) (0.78) (0.32) (0.61) (0.69)
3 months after 1.53** -1.64 0.11 -2.59 -3.06 2.70
(0.05) (0.17) (0.95) (0.18) (0.28) (0.49)
4 months after 0.80 -1.21 -0.77 -1.60 -3.59 2.82
(0.25) (0.25) (0.62) (0.35) (0.15) (0.40)
5 months after 0.8 -0.95 1.02 -0.99* -3.83 4.23
(0.19) (0.31) (0.45) (0.51) (0.08) (0.14)
6 months after 0.25 -0.77 4.50*** -0.25 -2.64 2.59
(0.65) (0.35) (0.00) (0.86) (0.20) (0.39)
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Table 9: Poisson Regression: ADRs and Tobin’s q
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model across the following two subsets of all firms is-
suing ADR in our sample: “High Tobin’s q Firms” includes all ADR issues from firms with above median
Tobin’s q in a country, and “Low Tobin’s q Firms” includes all ADR issues from firms with below median
Tobin’s q in a country. The Poisson regression models of 12 event window of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except
h = 0:lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h), where the number of
ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding
period local stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S.
stock market return in month t for an event window h; and adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate re-
turn of country n at month t. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t+h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t+h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns,
we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt + nt,
where exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period
currency return from month t+h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h ns, and the excess holding period currency return
from month t to month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h),
and excess holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. p-values (rounded to two decimal places)
are in parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Event Window Panel A: High q Firms Panel B: Low q Firms
6 months before 1.37*** 2.02*** -2.22* 1.69*** 0.34 -2.48**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.66) (0.03)
5 months before 1.29** 2.18*** -2.20* 1.80*** 0.29 -3.20***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.73) (0.01)
4 months before 0.93 1.78* -1.75 1.47*** 0.03 -2.77*
(0.13) (0.06) (0.23) (0.01) (0.98) (0.06)
3 months before 0.94 2.00* -1.99 1.70*** -0.59 -5.00***
(0.19) (0.07) (0.24) (0.01) (0.59) (0.00)
2 months before 1.26 2.84** -2.94 1.91** -0.15 -6.59**
(0.14) (0.04) (0.15) (0.02) (0.91) (0.00)
1 month before 2.57** 2.61 -4.14 1.00 1.03 -8.55***
(0.03) (0.17) (0.16) (0.40) (0.58) (0.00)
1 month after -0.47 1.13 2.25 -0.58 3.54* 3.16
(0.70) (0.54) (0.40) (0.63) (0.06) (0.23)
2 months after 0.76 -1.67 1.78 0.25 1.24 1.92
(0.39) (0.20) (0.35) (0.78) (0.36) (0.31)
3 months after 0.27 -0.98 1.97 0.2 0.61 2.11
(0.71) (0.37) (0.20) (0.78) (0.58) (0.16)
4 months after -0.19 -0.72 1.17 0.37 0.65 1.26
(0.77) (0.44) (0.38) (0.55) (0.50) (0.35)
5 months after -0.15 -0.34 1.73 0.07 0.16 2.08*
(0.78) (0.69) (0.14) (0.89) (0.85) (0.07)
6 months after -0.35 0.39 4.16*** 0.05 0.36 4.02***
(0.48) (0.61) (0.00) (0.92) (0.64) (0.00)
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Table 10: Poisson Regressions: ADRs Across Industries
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model for six major industry groups across all ADR issuing firms
in our sample. We use SIC codes to classify firms into 8 industries: Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Sales,
Financial, Construction, and Service. The Poisson regression models of 12 event windows of length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:
lnλnt = α(h) + β1(h)adjmktretnt(h) + β2(h)adjusrett(h) + β3(h)adjexrretnt(h) + νnt(h), where the number of ADR issues
from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess holding period local stock
market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period U.S. stock market
return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate return of country
n at month t. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t + h ,t] when h < 0), or
as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t + h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns, we
adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n +φ1nexrretnt−1 +φ2nexrretnt−2 +φ3nt+ nt, where
exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency return
from month t+h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h ns, and the excess holding period currency return from month t to
month t + h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess holding
period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. The Poisson model could not be estimated for Agriculture and
Construction industries since less than 5 ADR issues were available for each. We also report number of ADR issuances within
each industry, in parentheses next to the corresponding industry. p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in parentheses.
(*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
Panel A: Mining (20) Panel B: Manufacturing (147)
6 months before 0.62 1.15 -0.53 1.77** 0.21 -0.85
(0.70) (0.65) (0.88) (0.00) (0.81) (0.50)
5 months before 0.18 1.44 -3.56 2.03*** -0.08 -1.18
(0.92) (0.60) (0.39) (0.00) (0.94) (0.41)
4 months before -0.64 1.29 -4.07 2.02*** -0.53 -1.06
(1.29) (0.67) (0.39) (0.00) (0.62) (0.51)
3 months before -0.87 1.66 -3.95 2.10*** -0.85 -1.57
(0.71) (0.64) (0.47) (0.01) (0.49) (0.40)
2 months before 0.75 1.11 -1.26 2.13*** -0.01 -1.97
(0.79) (0.80) (0.85) (0.02) (0.99) (0.38)
1 month before -1.26 3.18 -2.03 1.64 0.21 -6.46**
(0.76) (0.60) (0.83) (0.21) (0.92) (0.05)
1 month after -1.90 2.96 2.25 -1.07 1.69 6.16***
(0.64) (0.63) (0.80) (0.43) (0.41) (0.01)
2 months after -0.59 1.46 6.54 -0.72 0.01 2.24
(0.84) (0.74) (0.22) (0.46) (0.99) (0.27)
3 months after 0.72 0.31 5.33 -0.35 -1.07 3.50 **
(0.76) (0.93) (0.25) (0.65) (0.37) (0.02)
4 months after 1.88 1.13 4.01 -0.15 -1.37 2.65*
(0.34) (0.72) (0.32) (0.83) (0.19) (0.06)
5 months after 1.32 0.57 3.69 0.07 -1.26 2.26*
(0.45) (0.84) (0.32) (0.91) (0.18) (0.08)
6 months after 0.73 -1.13 4.22 0.04 -0.60 2.66**
(0.65) (0.64) (0.20) (0.95) (0.48) (0.02)
Panel C: Utility (76) Panel D: Sales (13)
6 months before 1.69** 1.54 -2.46 0.96 5.86* -7.23*
(0.04) (0.24) (0.20) (0.67) (0.08) (0.10)
5 months before 1.85** 2.31 -2.23 1.51 7.79** -6.68
(0.04) (0.12) (0.29) (0.50) (0.03) (0.17)
4 months before 1.42 2.14 -1.30 2.64 3.81 -9.47*
(0.17) (0.19) (0.58) (0.30) (0.34) (0.09)
3 months before 0.66 3.00 -2.66 3.62 2.73 -6.32
(0.59) (0.11) (0.34) (0.22) (0.56) (0.34)
2 months before 0.99 3.98* -3.72 4.71 -0.97 -5.71
(0.50) (0.07) (0.28) (0.20) (0.86) (0.46)
1 month before 1.45 6.40** -4.00 7.87 -4.59 -4.31
(0.48) (0.05) (0.41) (0.12) (0.54) (0.69)
1 month after -0.35 -0.23 3.15 -1.88 1.27 -0.12
continued on next page
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Table 10 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
(0.87) (0.94) (0.46) (0.73) (0.87) (0.99)
2 months after 1.23 -1.87 4.67* -1.64 2.54 1.88
(0.41) (0.40) (0.09) (0.68) (0.64) (0.78)
3 months after 0.99 -1.33 3.71 -4.19 9.81** 1.06
(0.42) (0.47) (0.12) (0.16) (0.03) (0.83)
4 months after 0.91 -0.20 3.08 -6.06*** 6.81* -0.97
(0.39) (0.90) (0.14) (0.01) (0.07) (0.81)
5 months after 0.57 0.17 3.27* -6.20*** 9.94*** -2.22
(0.54) (0.91) (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.57)
6 months after 0.14 0.72 2.44 -6.17*** 9.29*** -0.66
(0.87) (0.58) (0.16) (0.00) (0.01) (0.85)
Panel E: Financial (42) Panel F: Service (50)
6 months before 1.51 0.70 -1.13 1.51 1.67 -1.61
(0.17) (0.69) (0.66) (0.18) (0.30) (0.48)
5 months before 1.38 0.49 -1.77 1.59 1.14 -2.12
(0.25) (0.80) (0.54) (0.20) (0.52) (0.41)
4 months before 0.91 0.26 -0.27 1.92 1.58 -1.99
(0.51) (0.90) (0.93) (0.17) (0.43) (0.49)
3 months before 1.04 -0.03 -0.93 1.90 1.23 -3.22
(0.52) (0.99) (0.80) (0.24) (0.59) (0.35)
2 months before 0.77 -0.37 -5.10 2.68 1.15 -4.38
(0.69) (0.90) (0.27) (0.17) (0.68) (0.29)
1 month before 0.47 -0.68 -2.70 0.24 2.99 -8.82
(0.86) (0.87) (0.67) (0.93) (0.44) (0.13)
1 month after -1.26 3.82 -5.37 -0.40 8.29** 1.72
(0.64) (0.36) (0.41) (0.88) (0.03) (0.76)
2 months after 1.42 -0.07 -1.23 1.25 2.16 2.87
(0.47) (0.98) (0.78) (0.54) (0.45) (0.50)
3 months after 0.53 -0.40 -1.66 1.33 2.18 2.43
(0.75) (0.87) (0.66) (0.43) (0.38) (0.44)
4 months after -0.78 0.42 -2.19 1.69 0.70 1.25
(0.58) (0.84) (0.49) (0.24) (0.73) (0.65)
5 months after -0.90 0.41 -2.01 1.49 -0.17 0.88
(0.48) (0.83) (0.47) (0.25) (0.93) (0.73)
6 months after -0.26 0.09 1.15 1.06 1.39 3.28
(0.82) (0.96) (0.63) (0.37) (0.41) (0.13)
43
Table 11: Poisson Regressions: ADRs Across Underwriters
This table presents estimates of the Poisson regression model for the subsets of ADRs underwritten by each of the top six major
ADR underwriting investment banks during our sample period: Credit Suisse First Boston (CFSB), Goldman Sachs, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Smith Barney. The Poisson regression models of 12 event windows of
length h ∈ [−6, 6] except h = 0:lnλnt = α(h)+β1(h)adjmktretnt(h)+β2(h)adjusrett(h)+β3(h)adjexrretnt(h)+νnt(h), where
the number of ADR issues from country n in month t follows a Poisson distribution, Poisson(λnt); adjmktretnt(h) is the excess
holding period local stock market return of country n in month t for an event window h; adjusrett(h) is the excess holding period
U.S. stock market return in month t for an event window h; adjexrretnt(h) is the excess holding period dollar exchange rate
return of country n at month t. An event window is defined either as |h|-month before the observation month t (i.e., [t+h ,t] when
h < 0), or as h-month after the observation month t (i.e., [t, t+h] when h > 0). To compute excess dollar exchange rate returns,
we adjust for autocorrelation and time trends by estimating exrretnt = φ0n + φ1nexrretnt−1 + φ2nexrretnt−2 + φ3nt + nt,
where exrretnt is the dollar exchange rate return of country n at month t. Then we compute the excess holding period currency
return from month t + h to month t, adjexrretnt(h<0), as
∑t−1
s=t+h ns, and the excess holding period currency return from
month t to month t+h, adjexrretnt(h>0), as
∑t+h
s=t+1 ns. Excess holding period local stock returns, adjmktrett(h), and excess
holding period U.S. stock returns, adjusretnt(h), are similarly defined. We also report number of ADR underwritten by each
investment bank, in parentheses next to the corresponding investment bank. p-values (rounded to two decimal places) are in
parentheses. (*), (**), and (***) indicate the estimate is significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
CSFB (18) Goldman Sachs (81)
6 months before 0.67 1.90 3.43 2.08*** 0.31 -1.31
(0.68) (0.47) (0.36) (0.01) (0.80) (0.48)
5 months before 0.20 1.46 2.77 2.83*** 0.16 -1.73
(0.91) (0.62) (0.50) (0.00) (0.91) (0.40)
4 months before -0.65 1.30 2.01 2.61*** 1.55 -1.64
(0.75) (0.69) (0.67) (0.01) (0.32) (0.48)
3 months before -2.31 2.69 -2.52 2.60** 1.32 -2.23
(0.34) (0.47) (0.67) (0.02) (0.46) (0.41)
2 months before -1.94 0.20 -4.70 3.00** 1.46 -3.98
(0.51) (0.96) (0.52) (0.02) (0.51) (0.23)
1 month before -1.68 8.45 3.59 3.82** 1.00 -3.75
(0.68) (0.18) (0.69) (0.03) (0.74) (0.42)
1 month after -6.68* 8.56 0.63 -1.07 1.94 3.67
(0.10) (0.16) (0.95) (0.58) (0.51) (0.37)
2 months after 0.87 -0.62 2.64 0.99 -0.31 4.46*
(0.76) (0.89) (0.70) (0.48) (0.89) (0.10)
3 months after -1.46 0.01 -2.95 0.09 -0.92 3.64
(0.55) (1.00) (0.62) (0.94) (0.60) (0.11)
4 months after -1.45 2.23 0.90 0.08 -0.57 1.85
(0.49) (0.49) (0.85) (0.94) (0.71) (0.38)
5 months after -1.94 2.24 1.17 0.04 -0.06 1.99
(0.30) (0.44) (0.78) (0.97) (0.97) (0.29)
6 months after -1.93 3.01 0.37 -0.24 0.26 2.66
(0.26) (0.27) (0.92) (0.77) (0.83) (0.11)
Lehman Brothers (21) Merrill Lynch (55)
6 months before 1.48 0.20 0.65 1.53* -0.25 -4.31*
(0.29) (0.94) (0.85) (0.09) (0.87) (0.07)
5 months before 1.79 2.59 -0.96 2.16** -0.53 -3.72
(0.23) (0.35) (0.81) (0.02) (0.75) (0.15)
4 months before 1.62 2.56 -1.66 1.94* -1.11 -2.66
(0.33) (0.41) (0.71) (0.08) (0.54) (0.36)
3 months before 2.14 3.84 -2.38 2.61** -1.88 -2.69
(0.26) (0.28) (0.65) (0.03) (0.37) (0.43)
2 months before 1.58 6.90 1.40 3.20** -2.26 -6.25
(0.50) (0.13) (0.81) (0.03) (0.37) (0.13)
1 month before 2.84 2.82 2.11 4.54** -3.16 -11.04
(0.38) (0.64) (0.80) (0.02) (0.37) (0.05)
1 month after -1.48 5.78 -1.69 1.89 0.03 -6.92
(0.68) (0.34) (0.85) (0.39) (0.99) (0.23)
continued on next page
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Table 11 (continued)
Event Window β1(h) β2(h) β3(h) β1(h) β2(h) β3(h)
2 months after 0.25 -2.08 -3.38 1.66 -2.88 -2.28
(0.92) (0.61) (0.60) (0.30) (0.24) (0.57)
3 months after -0.30 0.18 -2.30 0.84 -1.11 -3.40
(0.89) (0.96) (0.66) (0.52) (0.59) (0.31)
4 months after -1.06 1.36 -1.95 0.89 -1.89 -2.69
(0.55) (0.65) (0.66) (0.44) (0.29) (0.35)
5 months after -0.95 0.77 -1.22 0.91 -2.68* -2.48
(0.56) (0.77) (0.75) (0.37) (0.09) (0.33)
6 months after -0.57 0.70 -2.56 0.66 -1.90 -2.48
(0.70) (0.77) (0.49) (0.48) (0.18) (0.29)
Morgan Stanley (55) Salomon Smith Barney (21)
6 months before 2.20** 0.34 0.01 1.24 -0.17 -0.83
(0.02) (0.82) (0.99) (0.38) (0.95) (0.81)
5 months before 1.55 0.49 0.75 0.97 1.43 -1.42
(0.13) (0.77) (0.75) (0.53) (0.60) (0.71)
4 months before 1.69 0.49 2.28 1.90 -1.66 -4.82
(0.15) (0.80) (0.36) (0.27) (0.58) (0.29)
3 months before 0.97 0.25 3.64 1.62 0.74 -8.96*
(0.48) (0.91) (0.18) (0.41) (0.84) (0.10)
2 months before 1.92 0.07 2.50 -0.49 3.03 -8.27
(0.25) (0.98) (0.48) (0.85) (0.49) (0.19)
1 month before 2.52 0.85 -2.88 -3.67 4.16 -11.64
(0.27) (0.82) (0.61) (0.31) (0.48) (0.19)
1 month after -1.24 0.50 8.12** 4.73 -1.89 -16.60**
(0.59) (0.89) (0.03) (0.15) (0.76) (0.04)
2 months after -0.59 1.53 3.50 2.49 -1.57 -10.25*
(0.73) (0.56) (0.28) (0.31) (0.72) (0.09)
3 months after 1.16 -0.46 6.60*** 1.73 -4.29 -6.87
(0.39) (0.83) (0.00) (0.42) (0.20) (0.21)
4 months after 1.03 -0.16 4.49** 3.24** -5.18* -7.15
(0.38) (0.93) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
5 months after 1.34 -0.21 3.27 2.95* -3.91 -5.40
(0.20) (0.90) (0.13) (0.05) (0.15) (0.18)
6 months after 1.14 0.30 5.01*** 2.67** -2.58 0.02
(0.22) (0.84) (0.01) (0.05) (0.29) (1.00)
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates,
i.e., the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the following equation:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue
in country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The estimated cumulative impact of ADR
issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines. We also display 90% confidence
intervals, centered around zero, constructed using bootstrapped standard errors. The bootstrap procedure consists of randomly
drawing returns from the observed time series with replacement and estimating the aforementioned model with the resulting
sample. After repeating this procedure 1000 times, we compute the corresponding standard errors. The plots are displayed for
the whole ADR sample as well as two subsets of ADRs: Capital raising (Level III) ADRs and non-capital raising (Level II)
ADRs, i.e., CR ADRs and non-CR ADRs, respectively.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Regional Groups
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates,
i.e., the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the following equation:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue
in country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The estimated cumulative impact of ADR
issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Financial Crises
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates.
More specifically, it plots the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal
currency returns around ADR issues occurring over the portion of the sample period privy of financial crises (in dotted lines),
and
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj+δ
∗
j , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR issues occurring during financial
crises (in solid lines). Coefficients δj and δ
∗
j are obtained from estimating the following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) +
6∑
j=−6
δ∗j I
∗
nt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return, Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue in
country n in month t + j and zero otherwise, and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one ADR issue in
country n in month t+ j and month t+ j is considered a crisis period. Crisis periods are defined as December 1994 to January
1995 for the Mexican Peso Crisis, July 1997 to November 1997 for the Asian Crisis, and August 1998 to January 1999 for the
Russian Crisis.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Market Integration
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue date for
the whole sample and the subset of emerging markets. More specifically, it plots the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal currency returns around ADR issues occurring over the portion of the
sample period before market integration (in dotted lines), and
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj + δ
I
j , i.e., estimates for the cumulative abnormal
currency returns around ADR issues occurring after market integration (in solid lines). Coefficients δj and δ
∗
j are obtained from
estimating the following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) +
6∑
j=−6
δIj I
I
nt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return, Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue in
country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise, and IInt is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one firm in country n issued
ADR in month t + j and month t + j is past the endogenous financial integration date for country n estimated by Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002, Table 3) and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month.
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Figure 5: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns around ADR Issues: Firm and Issue Size
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates
across four subsets of all firms issuing ADR in our sample: “BigBig” includes all large ADR issues (i.e., above the median
relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above the median issuing firm size) in a country; “BigSmall” include all large
ADR issues (i.e., above the median relative ADR issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a
country; “SmallBig” includes all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR issue size) from large firms (i.e., above
the median issuing firm size) in a country; and “SmallSmall” include all small ADR issues (i.e., below the median relative ADR
issue size) from small firms (i.e., below the median issuing firm size) in a country. The cumulative abnormal impact of ADR
issues is measured as the cumulative sums of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue
in country n in month t + j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The estimated cumulative abnormal
impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 6: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Tobin’s q
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates
for two subsets of all firm issuing ADR in our sample: “High q Firms” includes all ADR issues from firms with above median
Tobin’s q in a country; and “Low q Firms” includes all ADR issues from firms with below median Tobin’s q in a country. The
cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues is measured as the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the
following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue
in country n in month t + j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The estimated cumulative abnormal
impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 7: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns Around ADR Issues: Industries
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates for
six major industry groups across all ADR issuing firms in our sample. We use SIC codes to classify firms into eight industries:
Agriculture, Mining, Manufacturing, Utility, Sales, Financial, Construction, and Service. The cumulative abnormal impact of
ADR issues is measured as the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients
∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR
issue in country n in month t+ j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The model could not be estimated
for Agriculture and Construction industries since fewer than five ADR issues were available for each of them. The estimated
cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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Figure 8: Cumulative Abnormal Exchange Rate Returns around ADR Issues: Underwriters
This figure plots the estimated cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues on exchange rate returns around ADR issue dates
for the subsets of ADRs underwritten by each of the top six major ADR underwriting investment banks during our sample
period: Credit Suisse First Boston (CFSB), Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon
Smith Barney. The cumulative abnormal impact of ADR issues is measured as the cumulative sum of estimated coefficients∑6
j∈[−6,6] δj in the following regression:
nt = α+
6∑
j=−6
δjInt(j) + ηnt,
where nt is the detrended exchange rate return and Int(j) is a dummy variable equal to one if there is at least one ADR issue
in country n in month t + j and zero otherwise. Time 0 is the ADR issuance month. The estimated cumulative abnormal
impact of ADR issues are plotted in solid lines. Their 95% confidence intervals are plotted in dotted lines.
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